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1 Introduction: science and fiction
Scientific models and fiction have one noticeable feature in common. Their 
representational relation to the physical world is ambiguous. It is often not 
obvious whether certain elements in a model represent something in the world 
or are an artifact of a model’s internal structure. Fiction, too, can mimic our 
world to varying degrees, as fictional worlds sometimes contain historical char-
acters or events, such as Henry VIII orr the Stonewall Riots. 
When we use scientific models, however, expectations of how our infer-
ences address the world differ from interpretations of fiction. We consider sci-
entific models to be representations that are true about something in the world. 
By contrast, we regard fictions as being important records of human culture, 
but not as true of anything in particular. Wherein is this difference grounded, 
and how is it justified? 
The increasing dependency of scientific research on mediated forms of 
observation and depiction makes this q question central to philosophical inter-
est about the characteristics of scientific representation. Laboratory conditions 
are hardly representative of many natural phenomena that we aim to investi-
gate through them. That is true no matter whether we talk about the devel-
opment and use of model organisms (Ankeny and Leonelli, 2011), set-ups 
in sensory measurement (Barwich and Chang, 2015), or studies of protein 
synthesis (Rheinberger, 1997). From this perspective, a large part of the philo-
sophical debate has engaged with the deep dependency of scientific inquiry on 
indirect modeling practices. If modern science builds on a necessarily mediated 
approach, how must we understand its claim of giving us access to (the funda-
mentals of) reality?
In reply to this question, some philosophers have started comparing scien-
tific representations with fiction to understand their potentially common basis 
as cognitive strategies (Suárez, 2009). Consider the case of idealizations or abstrac-
tions. These strategies provide us with scenarios of events or the behavior of 
entities in particular circumstances. In many cases, such as ideal gases or fric-
tionless planes, these scenarios are not realized or realizable in the actual world. 
Is there something that distinguishes these scenarios from fictionalizations? 
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My focus in this chapter is on the special epistemic role that we assign to 
scientific representations as giving us indirect access to the reality of nature. A 
significant number of philosophical arguments have been directed at the dyadic 
relation between a model and its target system. Central to these arguments is 
an understanding of representations that addresses their structural features (e.g., 
isomorphism) or their conventional use as “as if scenarios.” Here, I pursue an 
alternative tactic. Looking closely at model-building strategies, I focus on the 
interpretative strategies that deal with the representational limits of models. 
The chief question is, how do we interpret ambiguous elements in models? 
Moreover, how do we determine the validity of inference about information 
that is not explicit in a model? I suggest that the answer lies in the particular 
strategies that link a model to other methods in an experimental context. 
In what follows, the chapter begins in Section 2 with the problem of rep-
resentation in the contemporary philosophy of science. After introducing the 
reasons that prompted a comparison of scientific models with fiction, I argue 
that the problem of ambiguous inference emerges from two essential features 
of representations, namely their hybridity and incompleteness. To distinguish 
between fictional and non-fictional elements in scientific models, my proposal 
is to look at the integrative strategies that link a particular model to other meth-
ods in an ongoing research context. To exemplify this idea, I examine protein-
modeling through X-ray crystallography as a pivotal method in biochemistry. 
As many readers from the humanities and the arts may not be familiar with this 
method, section 3 introduces the procedure in greater detail. My reason for this 
is to allow the reader to judge whether she considers my concluding analysis of 
the underlying fictionalization strategies in section 4 as adequate.
2 Context and argument: the problem of representation
What are the origins of the philosophical debate about whether a scientific 
representation represents reality accurately? Besides, what epistemological con-
cerns suggest a comparison of scientific models with fiction? These questions 
have an inevitable historical dimension, so three main factors must be pointed 
out briefly. First, there is the legacy of radical theory changes, especially in 
nineteenth-century chemistry and twentieth-century physics. These changes 
shattered the epistemic confidence in our scientific methods and models. How 
can we be sure that our current theories and representations are more truthful 
than those left to rot in the graveyard of scientific history? Will our current 
concepts and models fail us, too? This issue is known as the pessimistic meta-
induction in the philosophy of science, and if history is any indicator, a cau-
tious attitude towards proper candidates for truth is advisable. 
Second, the rise of studies that recognized science as an essentially social and 
historical endeavor further substantiated this caution. Social studies of science, 
especially over the second half of the twentieth century, demonstrated the con-
tingency of factors that shape scientific advancement (Longino, 1990; Barnes, 
Bloor, and Henry, 1996). Third, when contemporary philosophy picked up 
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on these developments, it turned away from broad generalizations about the 
nature of science. Instead, philosophical scholars directed their attention to 
the cognitive and experimental practices that underlie scientific research, for 
instance, in the construction of scientific concepts and representations such as 
models (Morgan and Morrison, 1999; Nersessian, 2010). 
One line of investigation emerging from these advancements is the recent 
interest in the problem of representation (Knuuttila, 2005). As artifacts of 
human activity, how can scientific representations provide us with access to 
the world? How do we use these representations to gain knowledge about real 
things? Moreover, how must we understand cases of representational failure? 
On what basis are our model-based inferences justified? These questions have 
occupied many philosophers over the past decade. Their arguments revealed 
that scientific representations, as cognitive tools, often rely on fictionalization 
strategies or features that are shared by forms of fiction. 
The meaning of fiction in this context is that of mimicry and distortion 
(Frigg, 2010a). Fiction as mimicry refers to representations that are designed to 
resemble real phenomena without truly referring to them, or without claiming 
to be a proper or truthful representation of these phenomena. In comparison, 
fictions as distortions describe alterations that present an (intentionally or unin-
tentionally) alienated or converted image of a phenomenon. A differentiation 
of these two meanings, mimicry and distortion, is not necessarily clear-cut. 
Satire is a wonderful example of the thin conventional – and legal – line that 
holds between the mimicry of something (or somebody) in parallel with the 
explicit distortion of its features. Overall, this understanding of fiction centers 
on two fundamental philosophical topics: the reference of representations (or 
its suspension) on the one hand, and the truthfulness or accuracy of representa-
tions on the other.
Corresponding to this idea of fictionality, some philosophers of science 
encountered similar issues in the analysis of representations in science (for a 
collection of essays, see Suárez, 2009). Almost all scientific models build on 
various forms of distortions, abstractions, idealizations, imaginative scenarios, 
metaphorical comparisons, analogies, and so on (Hesse, 1966; Holyoak and 
Thagard; 1996; Van Fraassen, 2010). The influential “billiard ball” model of 
the atom by Dalton, the rise of the ball-and-stick model of chemical substances 
by August Wilhelm von Hofmann, or the Homo Economicus in economic 
theories are just some of the many prominent examples. Furthermore, many 
scientific entities were believed to be true initially, but turned out not to exist. 
Consider the abandoned scientific concepts of the ether, pneuma, phlogiston, 
or the idea of a spiritus rector. Nevertheless, these entities yielded experimental 
results and temporary insights into some aspects of the world at first, as it has 
been argued convincingly for the case of phlogiston (Chang, 2012).
However, the comparison of science and fiction is not immediately intu-
itive. It does not come as a great surprise to scientists that we should not 
take scientific representations as literal depictions of the world. Neither does 
it sound astonishing that science rests on a graveyard of theoretical entities 
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and proceeds through self-correction by its very nature. Science continuously 
changes and expands the scope of our knowledge by pointing at what we do 
not know. From this view, it is an infinite business (Deutsch, 2011). To be 
sure, these constitute central philosophical insights into the nature of science 
that have been gained over the past century. So, what does the comparison of 
science with fiction tell us from a contemporary perspective? 
It stands to reason that science and fiction are not the same things. We 
do ascribe scientific representations a different epistemic status. They tell us 
something about what is real. However, the appropriate grounds for this claim 
are not always clear. In response, there are several angles from which we can 
approach the special status of scientific representations. 
One way is to compare the structural features of scientific and fictional 
representations. What constitutes the resemblance or the similarity between 
a representation and its target system? Also, what are the functions of distor-
tions in this context? Some philosophical arguments defined representation as 
a straightforward mapping connection that relates a model structure to a physi-
cal structure. An example is isomorphism: “A Model M is a structure; and M 
represents a target system T if T is structurally isomorphic to M” (Frigg, 2002). 
By contrast, fiction does not seem to rest on such a correspondence. On this 
account, structure as a representational criterion is based on a dyadic compari-
son between models and target systems. 
Meanwhile, several arguments have shown that such a comparison does 
not lead to a clear demarcation of non-fictional from fictional representations. 
Criteria that seek to define the capacity of models to represent a target system 
through purely structural criteria must fail eventually (Goodman, 1969; Frigg, 
2002). My view on this issue is that criteria of “similarity” and “structure” 
(whatever these may be) are indeed insufficient. Though, I cannot help think-
ing that the use of structure in these arguments presents a straw man. 
Noticeably, this approach runs into trouble if we consider models as con-
glomerates and as consisting of different model ingredients (Boumans, 1999). 
From this perspective, the representational function of structures is contingent 
on the context of model-building. This point of view led to an emphasis on 
the epistemic context in which scientific representations are used (Knuuttila 
and Voutilainen, 2003). Here, the representational capacity of models and other 
scientific representations, such as diagrams or algorithms, is defined primar-
ily by their epistemic function instead of their structural correspondence. 
Representations are understood to act as vehicles for reasoning and for mak-
ing indirect inferences (Suárez, 2004). This means that representations are part 
of an imaginative act of “make believe.” They present us with “as if scenarios” 
that give us “fictional” as in model-dependent truths (Walton, 1990; Frigg, 
2010b; Toon, 2012). This idea strongly relies on a conventionalist understand-
ing of an institutional or collective agreement about the use of representations 
(Searle, 2010).
However, such reference to the use and conventions of an epistemic context 
seems to beg the question. It presupposes that we already know how to use 
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(parts of) a representation adequately (i.e., as denoting or non-denoting). In 
fact, this account even dodges the real issue of a comparison between fiction and 
non-fiction as long as it avoids an answer to the question about the particular 
character of scientific representations. In essence, on what grounds is something 
referred to as a non-fictional representation? How can we find out whether an 
inference is only a “fictional truth,” as in an essentially model-dependent truth, 
or whether it accounts for something model-independent but real?
In reply to this question, I propose an alternative tactic. Representations 
are neither judged by structural features in a dyadic comparison nor seen as 
make-believe scenarios. Rather, my focus is on the particular strategies that we 
employ in the interpretation of representations, and how these strategies help 
us to distinguish between what may be a fictional (model-dependent) and non-
fictional (representational) model-component. My argument consists of two 
claims about the ontology of representations, fictional as well as non-fictional.1 
These are as following: First, most representations, fictional and non-fictional, 
are hybrids. Second, every individual representation is incomplete. 
Beginning with the first claim, hybridity means that most representations 
contain denoting as well as non-denoting elements (for a more detailed argu-
ment see Barwich, 2013). For example, Bulgakov’s fictional novel The Master 
and Margarita tells us a story about the devil having a ball in Moscow of the 
1930s. Theological disputes aside, the devil is not what most people would 
consider a real person today. Nonetheless, there was such a place as Moscow of 
the 1930s. For a complementary example, consider the ball-and-stick models 
of chemical substances as a scientific representation. These models account for 
the basic spatial organization of a molecule, but in a highly idealized sense. 
In light of such mixed characteristics, it is often not intuitive what individual 
elements in a representation denote and what do not. Moreover, do these 
elements denote independently of the overall epistemic status of the repre-
sentation in which they are contained (i.e., does it matter whether these ele-
ments are part of a novel or a scientific model)? For example, does the fictional 
Napoleon in War and Peace refer to the real historical figure of Napoleon? 
More so, what if we encounter a fictional Napoleon that has little in common 
with our knowledge of the historical figure? What about the pig Napoleon 
in George Orwell’s Animal Farm? Besides, are non-existent entities that are 
part of working scientific models (such as silogens) fictions?2 Furthermore, can 
fictional elements be accidentally true? Consider the possibility that we find a 
real person that matches every description of a fictional character’s biography 
– without the author’s (and perhaps even that individual’s) knowledge. Is the 
fictional character suddenly a true description of this real person? There have 
been different answers to this problem, so it seems that the response depends 
on one's personal philosophical predilections (Ryle, 1933; Danneberg, 2006). 
Any position on this issue appears to presuppose a specific understanding and 
definition of what the notions of fictional and non-fictional entail. A clear 
demarcation between fiction and scientific representations as based on their 
denoting and non-denoting elements is inadequate.
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Alternatively, we must look at representational functions in context. In con-
text means analyzing what the individual components contribute to the con-
taining representation in question. This interpretative setting serves as the basis 
for inferences about these elements (Danneberg, 2006). On this account, nei-
ther the Napoleon in Tolstoi's War and Peace nor the pig Napoleon in Orwell's 
Animal Farm denotes the real Napoleon. Instead, these two figures refer to our 
knowledge about the real Napoleon without being used to argue or certify 
any claim about Napoleon as a historical person. Therefore, these fictional 
Napoleons constitute an image of a denoting element, meaning they are not 
used to denote but refer to other items that are. The function of Napoleon as 
an element in War and Peace is determined by its role in the fictional world-
story, not by its epistemic connection to historical sources (Barwich, 2013).
My second claim states that each form of representation is incomplete. 
Incomplete means they are limited and selective in their descriptions concern-
ing real world properties. For example, a map only contains specific elements 
depending on its purpose (e.g., transportation maps give you information about 
the underground and bus system, but not about altitude). Notably, advocates 
of scientific pluralism present a similar argument when they concern scien-
tific models. Models are necessarily limited in their content and scope. Their 
boundaries resonate with their epistemic objective: Are we aiming for realism, 
generality, or precision when using a model (Levins, 1966)? This methodo-
logical argument for pluralism derives from the ontological complexity of the 
physical world. To capture the multi-leveled, overlapping, and contingent fea-
tures of nature, especially of biological entities and processes, we need a mosaic 
of models (Mitchell, 2003; Wimsatt, 2007). 
Now, this has further consequences for our interpretation of such models. 
We sometimes look for information that is not explicit in a representation (for 
a more detailed argument, see Barwich, 2014). Sometimes this information is 
implicit. For example, reading a novel about two people falling in love, you 
possibly assume that these two individuals have a heart, a liver, and at least one 
functioning kidney, even if the author fails to mention this. It is because we 
know that people usually do not survive without these organs. We can make 
such explicit inferences even in fiction because any representation is somewhat 
“parasitic” on our common knowledge about the world and the use of lan-
guage concepts (Searle, 1975; Eco, 1994). Therefore, unless stated explicitly, 
any word or concept in fictional discourse has the same meaning and implica-
tions as it has in non-fictional discourse. 
What if we want to know about something that is not inferable in such an 
implicit sense? Some questions lead us to the limits of interpretation if they 
are not answerable by inferences based on the representation in question. For 
example, ask yourself, how many children had Lady Macbeth? There is no plain 
answer to this issue. Shakespeare’s Lady Macbeth may not be of the nurtur-
ing kind, but she could have had children, even though none are mentioned 
explicitly in the play (Knights, 1933).3 Likewise, we know that Captain James 
T. Kirk from the starship Enterprise is blond. However, is he a natural blond? 
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The vanity of his character does not exclude the possibility that he colors his 
hair regularly. We will never know for sure as long as no conclusive informa-
tion is provided. The same issue goes for the interpretation of scientific mod-
els. The chemical formulas of Berzelius, for example, give information about 
proportions but not about mechanical features of atoms, such as their size or 
shape (Klein, 2001). Nonetheless, in an ongoing experimental pursuit, such 
missing information is not left aside. It is addressed by amending the model or, 
alternatively, by looking for an answer through alternative models in the same 
research context. Identifying and clarifying such limits of models spurs further 
scientific inquiry. 
Persistent failure to provide a better account of such missing information in 
a model can also lead to serious doubt about the model’s referential grounds. 
Consider the case of phlogiston. Central to its ontology was the question of 
whether phlogiston is weightless, and the continuing inconsistencies in answer-
ing this issue were a reason for abandoning the substance (Kim, 2008; Barwich, 
2013). 
The upshot is that identifying and testing the limits of scientific represen-
tations is a useful way to determine whether a particular inference is only a 
model-dependent, fictional truth. Overall, this section outlined two central 
characteristics of representations, namely hybridity and incompleteness, which 
further allow us to compare and distinguish fictional and non-fictional repre-
sentations. The remainder of the chapter now elaborates on how we can use 
these two characteristics to make decisions about ambiguous elements in sci-
entific modeling contexts. For this, I now look at how scientists make sense of 
indeterminate inferences when using X-ray crystallography for protein models. 
Indeed, X-ray crystallography is an excellent example to analyze the problem 
of representation, as we will see that crystallographers face several of the repre-
sentational issues mentioned above. 
3 The case of X-ray crystallography
X-Ray crystallography is a principal method in biochemistry. It serves to deter-
mine the molecular structure of macromolecules such as proteins, and it works 
like this (Figure 4.1): Protein materials are prepared in specific detergents so 
that they form neat crystalline structures. These crystals are mounted on a goni-
ometer (an instrument that allows the rotation of the inserted object). When 
placed in the goniometer, the crystals are shot with beams of X-rays. These 
X-rays scatter on the crystal surface and form a diffraction pattern, which is col-
lected on an image plane or X-ray film. This diffraction data accounts for the 
electron density in the crystal structure. It serves as the basis to infer atom posi-
tions and, consequently, the molecular structure of the crystal (Drenth, 2007; 
Serdyuk, Zaccai, and Zaccai, 2007; Smyth and Martin, 2000).
Successful applications of this procedure are not without trickery and dif-
ficulties, of course. There is no simple mapping of the models onto the raw 
materials. Rather, instrumental access to macromolecules is facilitated through 
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several steps of manipulating the materials to fit the model requirements. The 
foundation of protein models in X-ray crystallography is not so much a recon-
struction but the very production of certain structures. The success of infer-
ences based on this method is contingent on the multiple steps for bringing the 
materials in correspondence with the requirements of the model procedure. 
Each of these steps carries its ambiguities and modeling problems. 
3.1 Distortions, or: making the materials fit the method 
The essential material precondition for X-ray crystallography is symmetry. So, 
why do we need symmetric crystals in the first place? Creating symmetric 
structures from organic matter is a difficult issue, but essential for successful 
data collection. 
To make crystals, you start out with proteins in a solution of high concen-
tration. You purify them and slowly remove the water by putting the materi-
als in a specific detergent. However, the crystallization of proteins can be a 
Figure 4.1  Basic steps involved in X-ray crystallography (image from Splettstoesser 2006). 
First, proteins are crystallized to form symmetric structures. These crystals 
are treated with X-ray beams to obtain diffraction data based on the electron 
density of the crystal structure. Diffraction patterns are further translated into 
electron-density maps from which to infer the position of atoms and the basic 
molecular structure of the protein. The resulting atomic model of the protein is 
refined by successive and iterative cycles of this procedure.
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daunting task, and it often involves a laborious trial-and-error procedure. “The 
magnitude of the problem can be understood when one considers the variables: 
the choice of precipitant, its concentration, the buffer, its pH, the protein 
concentration, the temperature, the crystallization technique, and the possible 
inclusion of additives (Smyth and Martin, 2000: 8).”
Some macromolecules form nice, symmetric crystalline structures. Others 
remain stuck in an unsymmetrical and flat formation. A particularly salient 
example for this are transmembrane proteins, such as the superfamily of 
G-protein-coupled receptors. G-protein-coupled receptors, or GPCRs, con-
stitute the largest protein gene family in the mammalian genome, and are 
involved in several fundamental biological processes such as vision, olfaction, 
the regulation of immune responses, and the detection of neurotransmitters. 
However, their instability prevents these transmembrane proteins from build-
ing regular crystalline structures easily. The first success in getting the struc-
ture of an active ternary complex of a GPCR through X-ray crystallography 
happened only a few years ago (Snogerup-Linse, 2012; Kobilka, 2013).4 Any 
attempt to crystallize proteins from the largest member of this protein super-
family, the olfactory receptors, has been unsuccessful to date (Crasto, 2009; 
Barwich, 2016). 
These difficulties aside, regular applications of X-ray crystallography 
require three-dimensional symmetric crystals. Symmetry is indispensable for 
combining the series of diffraction images that are collected while the crystal is 
rotated. Symmetry allows applying mathematical interpretations to these dif-
fraction patterns and to turn them into electron-density maps. The reason for 
this is because crystals facilitate the determination of “unit cells,” those parts of 
the crystal that form its smallest repeating units (Figure 4.2). These unit cells act 
as a metric index to determine the dimensions of the overall crystal structure. 
They further relate the series of individual diffraction images to each other: 
“Computer programs for autoindexing do this by calculating a prediction of 
Figure 4.2  Schematic representation of the principle of unit cells in X-ray crystallography 
with the example of the Wurtzite crystal structure (a mineral structure). Unit 
cells are the smallest repeating unit (left) from which to infer the general 
structural dimensions of the crystal (middle) and its geometric arrangement 
of the crystal (right). Unit cells act as an index. Images taken from Benjah-
bmm27, 2007 (left); Solid State, 2008 (middle); Mayer, 2007 (right).
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what the diffraction image will look like from the cell dimensions and orienta-
tion, then attempting to fit the real image with the predicted one (Smyth and 
Martin, 2000: 12).”
This is why you need symmetric crystals for the method to work. Data 
from flat or unsymmetrical crystals are incomplete, distorted, and impossi-
ble to accommodate with the mathematical tools (Smyth and Martin, 2000). 
Distorted and indeterminate data pose significant limits for legitimate infer-
ences to the molecular structure and constitution of macromolecules, such as 
proteins. However, even obtaining “good enough” diffraction data has its dif-
ficulties and limits. As mentioned earlier, some proteins are harder to crystallize 
than others, such as transmembrane receptors. Furthermore, proteins, when 
treated with X-rays, disintegrate quickly and, as a result, the collected diffrac-
tion data can be incomplete or insufficient. Concerning the gradual disintegra-
tion of proteins during the procedure, the first diffraction image is usually of 
the best quality. 
This issue of indeterminate data is more than a matter of temporary tech-
nological concern. It marks the methodological dependence of experimental 
research on the available instrumental tools and the structural aspects of the 
material to which they are responsive. Successful inferences to the molecular 
dimension of proteins do not ground in an essential trait or structure of the 
raw materials per se. On the contrary, proteins are irregular and dynamic when 
untreated. Instead, methods such as X-ray crystallography rely on artificially-
produced features, such as symmetry. That said, the production of symmetric 
crystals is not the only methodological requirement for successful model-build-
ing through X-ray crystallography.
3.2 Incomplete information in model-based inferences
The next basic step is the analysis of diffraction data and their transformation 
into electron-density maps. What we see in recordings of diffraction patterns is 
a distribution of electron density (Figure 4.3). The concentrated rings of spots 
are the result of diffracted X-rays that are emitted from the crystal and collected 
on an imaging plane. These spots indicate electron clouds. Now, how do we 
get to the molecular structure of proteins from a measure of electron density? 
Meaning, how do we infer atom positions from these electron spots? 
This is a matter of data-processing. The analysis of diffraction patterns rests 
on the distinction between meaningful diffraction data and mere background 
noise. This distinction is crucial for further calculations and to transform the 
diffraction data into readable electron density maps (Figure 4.4). These density 
maps then allow us to infer atom positions and the molecular organization of 
the protein. Notably, in the early applications of X-ray crystallography, this 
was the very problem. What is the noise to data ratio? Moreover, what do we 
see when we look at the diffraction data?
X-ray beams come in waves, and waves have different phases. However, we 
can only record the overall intensity of beams on the image planes. Thus, the 
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Figure 4.3  X-ray diffraction pattern (image from Dahl, 2006). Concentrated rings of spots 
are the result of the diffracted X-rays, which are emitted from the crystal and 
collected on an imaging plate. Spots indicate electron clouds.
Fig. 4.4  Representation of a protein crystal structure where atoms and molecular units are 
built into an electron density map. (Image from Bassophile 2007.) 
recordings do not tell us anything about the particular phase the waves are in 
when hitting the plate. Are these waves in sync (in phase) or not (out of phase)? 
To be sure, different phases result in different intensities of the recorded spots. 
However, to understand what these diffraction spots represent, and to infer 
atom positions, we need to know in which phase the X-ray beams are when 
they hit the plate (Figure 4.5). How does one get access to this information? 
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The mere diffraction patterns do not allow for inferences to the wave phases, 
and the issue is known as the “phase problem.”
Solving the phase problem was an ingenious piece of work by the molecu-
lar biologist Max Perutz at Cambridge, 1962 Nobel Laureate in Chemistry 
(Perutz, 1942; 1962). Perutz wanted to solve the molecular structure of hemo-
globin, a complex protein. He saw himself confronted with the missing phase 
information, resulting in a lack of representational stability and a strong ambi-
guity in data recordings. The solution to this query he obtained by adopting 
a method previously used by of one of his colleagues, J. M. Robertson at 
Glasgow University: isomorphous replacement (Pietzsch, 2016).
Isomorphous replacement works by soaking the protein in a heavy atom 
solution, such as mercury or platinum. The protein incorporates one or 
more of these heavy atoms, but this does not change its spatial configuration. 
Nonetheless, the incorporation of heavy atoms modifies the diffraction pat-
terns, since the “heavier” protein now contains more electrons. Therefore, we 
end up with two sets of data: the diffraction patterns from the original protein 
and the patterns of the protein containing heavy atoms. Comparing these data 
sets, any differences in recorded intensities are due in large part to the presence 
of heavier atoms. From this we can derive the missing phase information. The 
subtle differences in intensities between the data sets allow us to find the posi-
tion of the heavier atoms. These atoms then act as reference points to infer the 
phases (Smyth and Martin, 2000; Cowtan, 2003; Pietzsch, 2016).
The point that the resolution of the phase problem illustrates is that the 
interpretation of structural correspondence is a product of material manipu-
lations. Therefore, inferences derived from these structures must be judged 
carefully against the model-building requirements. What we see through such 
a detailed perspective on the process of model-building is again that the struc-
tural correspondence between a model and the materials reflects the methodo-
logical conditions of the procedure, and not necessarily essential, raw features 
of the materials. To be sure, presumptions about structural features are an inte-
gral part of modeling. Nonetheless, they cannot provide independent criteria 
for the evaluation of model-based inferences and the referential capacity of a 
scientific presentation.
Figure 4.5  Representation of different wave phases: in sync (left; from Haade, Wjh31) and 
out of sync (right; Quibik, 2010); the diffraction spots from in sync phases are 
stronger than those from out of sync waves.
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The third step is building the final protein model. For this, the quality of 
the electron-density map is crucial to determine the arrangement of molecular 
units for a three-dimensional model. Electron maps provide the basic outline 
wherein the protein structures are built (Figure 4.4). The higher the resolution 
of these maps, the less ambiguous is the identification of the relevant molecular 
units and subunits. The derived image presents us with a three-dimensional 
model of the protein structure. Lastly, the outputs are formatted and placed 
in the protein data bank (PDB).5 An integral part of this concluding step is 
the continuous refinement of the data analysis. Specifically designed molecular 
visualization programs facilitate the interpretation of structural features of the 
molecule, such as bond lengths and angles (Smyth and Martin, 2000). 
4  Integrative pluralism as a representational requirement in 
scientific practice
At this point, let us come back to the general issue of representation and the 
epistemic role we assign to scientific representations. In examining the details 
of X-ray crystallography, I deliberately avoided discussing how the problems 
in this procedure resonate with the debate about fictionalization strategies in 
scientific representation. My reasons for this was because I wanted to focus 
in more detail on how this method works from the practitioners’ perspective 
before connecting its modeling steps to the philosophical discussion at hand. 
To bring the different modeling steps together for further analysis, so far 
we have seen that multiple factors play a major role when building a protein 
model through X-ray crystallography. These factors concern the experimental 
manageability of the research materials, the generation of a sufficient range of 
data, the availability of appropriate methods to translate the diffraction patterns 
into electron-density maps, and also the introduction of data-processing tech-
niques, such as molecular visualization programs. All these factors are involved 
in a series of material and conceptual operations that shape and result in the 
final receptor model. In brief, these sequential steps comprise of:
· first, the material transformation of flexible proteins into stable and rigid 
crystal structures (fulfilling the requirement of symmetry);
· second, the material inscription from crystallized protein structure to dif-
fraction data (relying on Bragg’s model, or Bragg’s law);6
· third, the translation of diffraction data into electron density maps through 
the Fourier transform);7
· fourth, the subsequent inferences from the electron density map to a three-
dimensional model of the protein (using computational programs to calcu-
late and visualize the positions and relations of atoms as inferred from the 
electron clouds).8
The detailed dissection of modeling steps in X-ray crystallography revealed a 
chain of mediation between the raw materials and the final model. This chain 
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made explicit the several requirements by which we generate “structures” as a 
meaningful model ingredient. Although the successive modeling steps do not 
follow logically from each other, the manifestation of these steps is informed 
by, and grounded in, the inferences and structural correspondences established 
through their preceding ones. On this account, an analysis of scientific repre-
sentations based on dyadic and abstracted notions such as “structural similarity” 
or “resemblance” between a model and its target system must look too sim-
plistic to the practitioner to be of practical utility. To her, it matters more to 
suggest a heuristic perspective on how to deal with the ambiguous components 
in a modeling procedure, such as the phase problem. For this, a more detailed 
understanding of the method is necessary. 
Every model has a history that determines its construction and use and, in 
turn, its potential and limits for inference to the properties of the investigated 
materials. The models we derive from scientific methods are, therefore, not 
freely floating objects that correspond to the world through some depiction 
of abstracted features. Instead, these abstracted features are a representation of 
the steps that link specific structural assumptions to the materials in a series of 
manipulations. From this view, any evaluation of a model and the inferences 
drawn from it must be judged against the background knowledge on which 
the modeling procedure is based. In the case of crystallography, to assess how 
the derived protein structures do (or do not) account for protein properties and 
behavior, a mere look at the finalized end product is insufficient. 
The fictionalization strategies we encountered here included: (1) distortions 
(forcing proteins into symmetric crystals); (2) idealizations (predictions of crys-
tal structure through autoindexing of unit cells to align diffraction planes); (3) 
indeterminate data (disintegrating crystals); and (4) the underdetermination of 
models by data (recordings of electron spots as part of the phase problem). 
Indeed, it appears miraculous that this procedure could become one of the 
most reliable and standard methods in structural biology and biochemistry at all!
That said, these issues demonstrate the relevance of my two earlier hypothe-
ses, namely the hybridity and the incompleteness of representations. Regarding 
the first hypothesis, these fictionalization strategies embody the hybridity of 
crystallography models where certain elements do not strictly denote features 
of proteins but reflect the requirements of the modeling method. Concerning 
the second hypothesis, the incompleteness of representations, we may ask: 
How are the ambiguous model elements dealt with in X-ray crystallogra-
phy? Accordingly, how do the practitioners answer those questions about the 
materials that exceeded the available model structures? The kinds of issues 
that exceed a method usually arise from the particular purpose a method is 
designed to serve. 
The target of protein models, constituting the Holy Grail of modern bio-
chemistry, is to solve the relation between a protein’s structure and its function. 
Thus far, however, drug target studies and approaches to rational drug design 
operate on a labor-intensive trial and error basis (Drews, 2000). A pivotal rea-
son for the lack of principles after which to model structure-function relations 
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in proteins is the problem of protein-folding. After decades of elaborating on 
protein structures, it became apparent that there is no straightforward way 
to make predictions from the amino acid sequences to the three-dimensional 
configuration of proteins.9 Proteins often fold irregularly. However, the folding 
process fundamentally determines protein function. As a result, model-based 
inferences to ligand-binding in proteins require three-dimensional snapshots of 
proteins. This issue also explains why X-ray crystallographers are still in busi-
ness (Mitchell and Gronenborn, 2015).
Nevertheless, the irregularity between protein structure and function not 
only explains the continuing demand for crystallography. It also presents the 
limits of this procedure. A major concern for biologists is precisely what the 
protein models from X-ray crystallography do not show and the questions they 
cannot answer. 
Proteins are extremely specific in behavior and function. Their functioning, 
such as in molecular recognition, is a highly dynamic mechanism, involving 
several steps of conformational changes of proteins. Modern biology has there-
fore abandoned the lock-and-key metaphor. Instead, biologists refer to mod-
els of “induced” (Koshland, 1995) and “selected fit” (Monod, Wyman, and 
Changeux, 1965; Changeux, 2013). Here, proteins are not rigid but dynamic 
entities. They undergo multiple changes in their conformation. Several ques-
tions arise from such models of conformational changes, such as: Are these 
changes induced by the ligand, or do these changes take place in the absence of 
a ligand? (For more details on these mechanisms, see Barwich, 2016.) 
X-ray crystallography is unsuitable for determining the sequences of flexible 
conformational changes in protein-binding. It is also unfit to make inferences 
about the specific causal role of the ligand in this recognition mechanism. Yet, 
these are two essential issues for understanding protein behavior. From this 
view, the strength of this method is also the source of its ambiguity: How can 
we make inferences about protein behavior from the rigid representations of 
protein structure? 
Despite its overall success, concern about the limits of X-ray crystallogra-
phy has always been vocal. A source of such concern often goes back to the 
inevitable incompleteness of representations. We have seen this to be the case 
for inferences about the binding behavior. Additionally, such characteristic of 
incompleteness is inevitably part of the model-building procedure, not only of 
the final product. For example, the big issue in the earlier applications of this 
method was the ambiguity of what the image planes show. When Perutz pre-
sented his diffraction patterns, it was Francis Crick, his student, who ambushed 
him severely in a public talk regarding the ambiguity of this data in light of 
the unresolved phase problem (Pietzsch, 2016). The issue was resolved after an 
additional procedure was implemented into the model. The data from isomor-
phic replacement resonated precisely with the structural requirements of the 
method, and this correspondence then allowed determining of the unknown 
phases. To be sure, once the phase problem was solved, other limits of the 
procedure were rendered visible.
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Nonetheless, scientists rarely judge the interpretation of a model in isolation. 
Additional procedures are used in parallel with a model to determine which 
parts of its inferences can be corroborated and complemented by other means 
or may constitute a potential artifact. Of particular importance is a satisfactory 
independence of some modeling parameters in the corroborating procedure. 
Of course, the issue then is to ascertain that the different procedures account 
for the same phenomenon and are coordinated with each other (Barwich and 
Chang, 2015). 
For example, complementary to X-ray crystallography, another way to build 
protein models is nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) spectroscopy. One of 
the limits of crystallography is the requirement of isolating the protein from its 
cellular environment and studying it through a crystalline state. In NMR, pro-
teins are used in a soluble state. “Furthermore, X-ray crystallography and NMR 
target different atomic features of a protein: X-ray crystallography relies on the 
scattering of X-rays by the electrons, while in NMR, interactions of nuclear 
spins with a magnetic field are explored (Mitchell and Gronenborn, 2015; 15).” 
In comparison, each method results in mediated representations of proteins 
outside their cellular environment. Still, both approaches count as reliable rep-
resentational sources for inferences about protein behavior in vitro. 
Overall, the difficulty of indeterminate inferences – meaning inferences 
that may not represent a physical entity but constitute a model artifact – are 
addressed through a comparison of data through different procedures. Such 
comparisons can be an indicator of inaccuracies and a reflection of a method’s 
biases. To correct these biases requires a deeper understanding of the struc-
tural requirements that fit the materials to the method in the model-building 
procedure. 
In closing, we must understand inferences to information that is not explic-
itly given in the model as means to determine how this model is linked to other 
methods in an experimental context. In contrast to fiction, interpretations of 
ambiguous elements and incomplete representation are how science proceeds. 
From this perspective, the epistemic distinction between science and fiction is 
not one inherent in a representational structure but in our way of dealing with 
such limits. Therefore, the integration of a scientific model with other methods 
ensures that its inferences are testable as being non-fictional (i.e., representative 
of a phenomenon) or as fictional (i.e., model-dependent and an artifact of the 
procedure). As science is ongoing, a scientific representation cannot be final. 
Therefore, its representational function and limits must be probed through its 
integration in an operating model context.
Notes
1 By representations, I mean all forms of public description and depiction, whether these 
are linguistic, algebraic, symbolic, pictorial, and so on.
2 Silogens are hypothetical entities in nanomechanical models. They are used to calculate 
silicon fractures and to combine theoretical assumptions from quantum mechanics and 
classical molecular dynamics. Silogens do not refer to real atoms. Instead, they are algo-
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rithmic combinations of the properties of two different entities in the modeling proce-
dure, namely silicon and hydrogen (Winsberg, 2009). Notably, my interpretation of the 
epistemic status of silogens differs from Winsberg’s (Barwich, 2014).
3 In a famous essay, entitled ‘How Many Children Had Lady Macbeth?’, the Shakespeare 
scholar L. C. Knights (1933) asked about the inferential limits in fictional works. This 
essay argued against the tendency of excessive over-interpretations in literature studies at 
this time.
4 Brian Kobilka received the 2012 Nobel Prize in Chemistry for this achievement. He 
shared this nomination with his former mentor Robert Lefkowitz, who received the 
award for his crucial work on the ß-adrenergic receptors and the general workings of 
GPCRs (Snogerup-Linse, 2012; Clark, 2013).
5 Website of the PDB: http://www.wwpdb.org
6 Cambridge physicist William Laurence Bragg and his father William Henry Bragg, pro-
fessor of mathematics at the University of Adelaide, determined the angles in which 
X-rays scattered from a crystal lattice. Together they were awarded the 1915 Nobel Prize 
in Physics. Lawrence Bragg was only 25 at the time and has been the youngest Nobel 
Prize winner in Physics to date (Nobel Media, 2016).
7 The Fourier transform allows calculating the frequencies that make up a signal (here, 
the X-ray beam). The Fourier transform is named after the nineteenth-century French 
mathematician and physicist, Joseph Fourier.
8 Examples for such molecular visualization programs are RasMOL and MOLMOL.
9 When we speak of protein structure, we must differentiate between four levels: primary 
structure (amino acid sequences), secondary structure (regular subunits of a protein such 
as helix domains), and tertiary structure (three-dimensional protein folding), and the 
quaternary structure (three-dimensional structure of multi-subunit proteins).
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